

### Biography and political behavior: determinants of parliamentary decision-making in mid-nineteenth century Germany, France and Great Britain

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# BIOGRAPHY AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR: DETERMINANTS OF PARLIAMENTARY DECISION-MAKING IN MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY GERMANY, FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN

Heinrich Best (+)

**Abstract:** The purpose of this study is to investigate how significant social-demographic characteristics are if we want to explain the political behavior and orientations of actors in past societies. We approached this problem on the basis of roll-call data and biographical data of the representatives of the Frankfurt National Assembly, the Paris Assemblée Nationale Constituante 1848/49 and the British House of Commons 1841 - 1842. For comparative purposes results of related studies about the Mexican National Assembly of 1916 - 1917 and the German "Reichstag" of 1893 and 1903 have been used. The main hypothesis was that the social background and the social affiliations of the representatives determined their parliamentary decision-making. This assumption has been tested first by a heterogeneous model ("basic model") which combines "standard" attributes of collective-biographical research: age, profession, membership in the nobility, and regional origin. In a second step we split up the basic model in three partial hypotheses, which have been derived from general assumptions concerning the genesis and transmission of political orientations:

1. an interested oriented approach which interprets political behavior according to the wish to get actual advantages in the contest for power, wealth and prestige;
2. an approach which emphasizes the effects of socialization and which assumes that political orientations have been acquired during political socialization and selection by institutions which transmit values and by experiences in the political career;
3. a theoretical approach which is focused on geographic representation and which assumes a close connection between parliamentary decision making and the orientations of the electors.

Multiple Classification Analysis was used to test the different models. The research reported in this paper was funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft.

## 1. PRESENTATION OF THE PROBLEM

The analysis of the social background of elites has an obvious justification when it concerns the investigation of recruiting processes: social-demographic characteristics constitute elements of the opportunity structure which determine the access and the career chances of the aspirants.(1) More problematical and controversial is the influence which the social background of the members of the elite has on their political attitudes and behavior.(2) Investigations concerning contemporary elites show that we must be very careful with intuitive suppositions in this area, since the type of influence and its extent varies considerably. In various cultural contexts variables which supposedly have a large influence were far less significant than expected.(3) On the other hand, in historical investigations an intuitive "psychologization" of social-demographic variables, i.e. inferences from

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social structure to social psychology, is still customary.(4) The purpose of this paper is to clarify this problem. In our analysis which is comparative and multi-variate, we have measured the effects of frequently used biographical variables on the political attitudes of representatives. Our intention is to make a contribution to the solution of the relevance problem in collective-biographical research and to give answers to the following questions: From which social-demographic variables does the greatest political influence proceed in varying contexts? How great is the total effect of the standardly used social background variables?

This methodological problem has substantive theoretical implications. The strength of the statistical relationship between the biographical characteristics of the representatives and the variables which measure their political attitudes is a sensible indicator of the degree of influence that socio-cultural cleavages have on parliamentary decision-making. We are proceeding here from the consideration that when political cleavages emerge from religious, ethnical, and regional disparities in a society, the personal attributes of representatives related to these cleavages obtain a political interpretation and significance.(5) This consideration can be illustrated by an example: The religious denomination of a representative is expected to have no political relevance in a society where different denominations coexist peacefully; however, in a society disturbed by religious conflicts the denomination will become group defining in the process of parliamentary decision-making. Here we are making the distinction between a segregated and an amorphous formation of the internal parliamentary structure. In the first situation there is a sharp social distinction between the political groups; in the second they are socially heterogeneous.

Proceeding from standard concepts of political sociology we will approach the general hypothesis of an association between societal conflict structures and parliamentary decision-making under three theoretical perspectives (6):

1. An interest-theoretical approach, which maintains that political action is directed by the striving for direct and personal advantages in the allotment struggle for power, wealth and prestige.
2. A socialization-theoretical approach, which maintains that political attitudes are acquired in the course of political socialization and selection by means of value mediating authorities and experiences during a political career.
3. A representation-theoretical approach which assumes that parliamentary decision making is linked to the expectations of the constituents.

By means of a basic model we have attempted to grasp the general connection between social-demographic variables and political attitudes. This model combines some standard variables of collective-biographical research which are also the core variables of the three approaches sketched above: age and occupation, noble status, and regional origin. The influence of the immediate parliamentary context on the political attitudes of the representatives - such as, the effects of political patronage and post-recruitment socialization, of "cue taking", and of party discipline, have not been taken into consideration in our study.

## 2. DATA AND METHOD

Our investigation combines data which we ourselves collected concerning biographical attributes and the voting behavior of the representatives of the Paris National Assembly and of the Frankfurt National Assembly of 1848/49 with a secondary analysis of data concerning the British House of Commons for 1841 up to 1847.(7) Additionally, research reports were used, which followed an approach similar to ours. These were a study of the Mexican Constitutional Convention of 1917(8) and an analysis of legislative behavior in the German Reichstage for the years 1898 and 1903.(9)

The tools and techniques used for testing the different models sketched above have been described in detail elsewhere.(10) Therefore we can restrict ourselves to some brief remarks. In essence we introduced social-demographic variables of the representatives as independent variables and correlated them with summary measures obtained from legislative roll-call data. Whereas the socio-demographic data pose only the familiar problems of selectivity, completeness and categorization, a word should be said about the dependent variable.

A major technical problem of the analysis of legislative behavior is the reduction of often more than hundreds of votes to summary indices which are able to represent the main dimensions of parliamentary decision making.(11) While in the past scaling procedures were used which presupposed the one-dimensionality of the items as, for example, Guttman-Scaling, we preferred methods which maintain the multi-dimensionality of legislative behavior in the process of the reduction of variables. Factor analysis is widely regarded as suitable for this analytical purpose.(12) As an additional advantage factor scores can be interpreted as sensible measures for the political positions of representatives.(13) Since factor scores have a metrical measurement level, they can be used as dependent variables together with qualitative biographical characteristics of the representatives in analyses of variance. With this we operationalize a major theoretical aspect of our investigation: the analysis of the extension of socio-cultural cleavages into the parliaments and the variation of this connection in different polities.


## 3. RESULTS

### 3.1. The Dimensions of Legislative Behavior

By the factor analysis of roll-call behavior (oblique solution) we identified one dominant principal factor for each of the three parliaments studied. The variance explained by that factor amounted to 47% in Germany, 21% in France, and 37 % in Great Britain. The factor having the next greatest eigenvalue lies clearly under these values: in Germany at 10 %, in France at 2 %, and in Great Britain at 5 %. A check of the factor loadings and the factor score correlations of the main factor with information about the political affiliations of the representatives (especially their party membership) clearly shows that the main factor represents the right-left-dimension of political attitudes.(14). This is an important substantive result. It shows that a dominant conflict front had developed in the three representative bodies we investigated in spite of all the differences in the length of parliamentary tradition, the range of political participation, and the extent of national integration. This conflict front spanned two poles which can be termed - the terminology may vary but the content remains the same - conservative-progressive, radical-moderate, left-right. At this point we have to refrain from the tempting task of discussing these findings in


GRAPH 1-3: THE DISTRIBUTION OF REPRESENTATIVES ON THE LEFT-RIGHT-  
INDEX

Graph 1:  
French National Assembly




MEAN	.00
MEDIAN	.21
MODE	-1.03

Graph 2:  
Frankfurt National Assembly



MEAN	.00
MEDIAN	.24
MODE	-1.29

Graph 3: British House of Commons 1841-1847



MEAN	.00
MEDIAN	.60
MODE	.93

detail. In our context these findings are interesting only insofar as the factor analysis of roll-call voting behavior provides equivalent indicators which measure comparable political positions of representatives in the three parliaments.

If the factor scores are assigned to the individual representatives, one arrives at a scale that provides information about the distribution of parliamentarians according to "left" and "right" positions. The distribution form in all three cases is clearly bimodal. Positions on the right are indicated by positive score values and positions on the left by negative score values. The extreme values lie respectively at circa +2 ("extreme right") and -2 ("extreme left"). The modes lie at circa +1 and -1. The grand sample means for all three parliaments are zero because factor scores are standardized.

The examination of mean score value deviations between the categories of the independent, in our case biographical, variables is the basis of Multiple Classification Analysis (MCA). This is the method that we have used to test the model variants developed in Section 1.(15) The following major statistics are provided by MCA:

1. Raw mean score values for each category of each independent (predictor) variable. These measures provide us with information, for example, about the average extent of "leftist" tendencies among publicists as compared to other occupational categories.
2. ETA-values, which indicate the ability of each predictor variable to explain the variation in the dependent variable. These coefficients give us information, for example, about the significance of the variable "regional origin" as compared to the variable "occupation".
3. "Adjusted" mean score values, which indicate what the mean would have been if the group had been exactly like the total population with respect to its distribution over all the other predictor classifications. This measure accounts for what we call the contingency of biographical attributes. With this we refer to the fact that social-demographic variables do not vary independently from one another. For example, an over-proportional number of large landowners are from the nobility and administrative officials usually have a legal education. The statistical complement of this circumstance is multicollinearity. If we want to determine the net-effect of social-demographic variables, it is necessary to adjust the data for such interactions. In the following analysis we have chosen an approach in which the interaction of each independent variable with all other independent variables is controlled (Classic Experimental Approach).(16)
4. BETA statistics which are directly analogous to ETA, but are based on the adjusted means rather than the row means. BETA provides a measure of the effect of a social-demographic variable, after the effects of all other background variables have been controlled.
5.  $R^2$  as an estimation of the proportion of variance in the dependent variable explained by all predictors together. This coefficient gives us information, for example, about the superiority of the socialization-theoretical or the interest-theoretical models.

Since our investigation aims at determining the effect of the configuration of biographical attributes on political behavior, we will be mainly referring to the BETA-values and to  $R^2$  when interpreting results. The

variations of adjusted mean score values of the right-left index for different social categories will be considered here only in reference to occupational categories. It should be noted that even in relation to the variable occupation a full comparison is only possible between the Frankfurt National Assembly and the Paris National Assembly. In the British House of Commons only a small section of the occupational system was represented as a result of the incompatibility provisions and the rigid electoral restrictions.

### 3.2. The Test of the Basic Model

#### 3.2.1 The Relationship Between Occupation and Political Attitudes

The test results of the basic model including all five types of information are presented in tables 1a to 1c for the three parliaments we investigated. If we compare the adjusted mean values of the left-right index for occupational categories and political systems a constellation of deviations and similarities appears which indicates both the influence of general determinants as well as the effect of specific socio-cultural conditions on political attitudes.

Table 1 a - 1 c insert here

The somewhat diffuse results of this investigation are summarized in the following synopsis:

	Germany	France	Great Britain
Left (Mean score index: < -.10)	Lawyers,  Publishers	Workers, Petite Bourgeoisie, Publishers	Businessmen,  Publishers
Indifferent (Mean score index: $\leq -.10$ , $\geq -.10$ )	Judicial Service, Administrative Service, Businessmen, Landowners	Lawyers,  Officers,  Businessmen, Landowners	Lawyers,  Officers
Right (Mean score index: > .10)	Educational Sector, Officers,  Clergy	Educational Sector, Administrative Service, Clergy, Judicial Service	Landowners

Two general statements can be distilled from these results:

1. In the parliaments we analysed there was no clear connection between economic interests and political attitudes. Neither large landowners nor businessmen can clearly be assigned to one political position. This finding is surprising because it contradicts the long-used practice of treating "the" bourgeoisie or "the" landed interests as a single actor whose specific class interest should have had a regulative effect on political action.<sup>(17)</sup> On the contrary, it becomes clear that political attitudes and behavior can not be satisfactorily explained by class

TABLE 1a - 1c: THE CONNECTION BETWEEN SOCIAL-DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES: A MULTIPLE CLASSIFICATION ANALYSIS OF THE BASIC MODEL

Independent Variables: Regional Origin, Noble Status, Occupation  
 Covariate: Age  
 Dependent Variable: Representatives' Position on the Right-Left-Index  
 (Positive Values: Right Positions  
 Negative Values: Left Positions)

Table 1a: The Members of the Frankfurt National Assembly 1848/49

Independent Variables and Categories	N	Mean Position on the Right-Left-Index (unadjusted)	ETA	Mean Position on the Right-Left-Index (Adjusted for Independents and Covariate)	BETA
REGIONAL ORIGIN					
Bavaria	75	.43		.43	
Southern Small and Middle States	77	-.93		-.85	
Central German Small and Middle States	81	-.68		-.62	
Northern Small and Middle States	82	.13		.18	
Prussia: Rhineland	75	.27		.26	
Prussia: Baltic Prov.	108	.59		.48	
Prussia: Silesia, Sax.	76	.16		.11	
Austria: Bohemia	41	-.68		-.63	
Austria: Other Provinces	112	.13		.12	
			.51		.46
NOBLE STATUS					
No	616	-.09		-.05	
Yes	111	.48		.30	
			.21		.13
OCCUPATION					
Judicial Service	137	.14		.03	
Administrative Service	140	.10		.03	
Educational Sector	124	.11		.18	
Officers	15	.58		.32	
Clergymen	34	.29		.31	
Businessmen	50	-.06		.00	
Landowners	57	.30		.04	
Lawyers	105	-.46		-.30	
Publishers, Other Professions	64	-.50	.29	-.29	.19
Grand Mean = .01			<sup>2</sup> R = .31		N = 776
Number of missing observations = 49					



Table 1b: The Members of the French National Assembly 1848/49

Independent Variables and Categories	N	Mean Position on the Right-Left-Index (unadjusted)	ETA	Mean Position on the Right-Left-Index (Adjusted for Independents and Covariate)	BETA
REGIONAL ORIGIN					
Brittany	120	.57		.45	
South West	60	-.09		-.06	
Languedoc	129	-.44		-.40	
North East	104	-.62		-.59	
Central Mountains	207	.14		.15	
Burgundy	47	-.57		-.50	
Paris Area, Champagne	203	.27		.26	
Colonies	16	.07		.03	
			.40		.36
NOBLE STATUS					
No	755	-.10		-.08	
Yes	131	.60		.44	
			.25		.18
OCCUPATION					
Judicial Service	67	.08		.13	
Administrative Service	34	.38		.23	
Educational Sector	34	.02		.13	
Officers	45	.22		.07	
Clergymen	14	.85		.66	
Businessmen	117	.00		.07	
Landowners	195	.18		.05	
Lawyers	234	-.10		-.05	
Publishers, Other Professions	101	-.34		-.28	
Petite Bourgeoise, Workers	45	-.39		-.26	
			.23		.16
Grand Mean = -.01					
R = .22					
N = 910					
Number of Missing Observations = 24					

Table 1c: The Members of the British House of Commons 1841-1847

Independent Variables and Categories	N	Mean Position on the Right-Left-Index (un-adjusted)	ETA	Mean Position on the Right-Left-Index (Adjusted for Independents and Covariate)	BETA
Regional Origin					
South England	291	.16		.16	
North England	256	.02		.05	
Scotland	63	-.32		-.28	
Ulster	36	.62		.54	
South Ireland	77	-.72		-.78	
			.31		.31
Noble Status					
No	402	-.08		-.01	
Yes	321	.11		.01	
			.09		.01
Occupation					
Landowners	332	.15		.14	
Businessmen	102	-.48		-.48	
Lawyers	111	.01		.07	
Publishers, Other					
Professions	26	-.68		-.73	
Officers (Also Retired)	152	.10		.08	
			.25		.25
	2				
Grand Mean = -.01	R = .16		N = 723		
Number of Missing Observations = 92					

interests. We have a picture of a diversely shaped political landscape showing lines of coalition and conflict that transcend classes.

2. Some findings indicate that the horizon of political experience characteristic of a specific occupational category allows for a better prediction of political positions than economic interests do. This is especially true of the different possibilities and ways to obtain positions of power or appropriation opportunities controlled by the state. Thus, a large number of judges and administrative officials in the French National Assembly had obtained their positions as a result of "patronage". As favorites of the July-Monarchy they distanced themselves from a reform or revolutionary course. Their sympathies were for the right.(18) On the other hand, their German counterparts were chiefly career civil servants, who viewed politics as a continuation of their official business by other means. They could look back at a tradition of a "revolution from above" which was carried out by the civil service. In view of the varying degrees of loyalty and conviction their political attitudes were more heterogeneous.(19)  
The situation was different with the military: In Germany during 1848 and 1849 they were commonly seen as the defenders of the monarchical principle. In France there was a "praetorian" tradition which could be connected to the positions of the left. In Great Britain the officers as a social category could not be placed in any specific political position.(20)

These few hints suggest that the occupational background of the representatives influenced their political positions via their political experiences before entering into the parliament and not via their economic interests.

An examination of the BETA statistics confirms that the variable "occupation" is less significant than the wide-spread hypothesis of a guiding of political attitudes by economic interests suggests. In the British House of Commons and in the Frankfurt National Assembly the significance of "occupation" was behind that of "region". In the Paris National Assembly it was also behind the variable "noble status". In the Mexican Constituent Convention occupation and age were those variables with the least explanatory power.

The range of this finding, however, appears to be limited. For the Reichstag at the turn of the century there is a definitely stronger connection reported by Smith and Turner ( $ETA = 0.5$ ).<sup>(21)</sup> Though this result is subject to the reservation that the contingency of biographical variables has not been adequately controlled in this investigation we nevertheless suppose that the findings for the Kaiserreich indicate a process which contemporaries called the "socialization of parliament": i.e. the progressive crystallization of political structures along socio-economic cleavages.<sup>(22)</sup>

But, even if the scope of our findings is reduced, we can maintain that the often unexamined but imputed explanatory power of the variable "occupation" for political attitudes is relativized by our results. Thus, the adoption of left and right positions is not, as a rule, a function of interests and mentalities related to occupational status.

### 3.2.2 The Connection Between Age and Political Attitudes

The age of the parliamentarians had the least influence of the variables included in the basic model. This is true for all of the three parliaments we investigated as well as the Mexican Constituent Convention and the Reichstage of 1898 and 1903. The contribution of age to the explanation of the variance of the left-right-index varies between 1 % and 3 %. This finding as well as technical considerations motivated us to introduce age

only as a covariate in our model. What should be kept in mind is that the conflict between right and left positions, in all those cases for which we have data, can not be interpreted as cohorts or as generation conflicts.(23)

### 3.2.3 The Connection Between Noble Status and Political Attitudes

Noble status had a relatively large influence in the Frankfurt National Assembly and in the Paris National Assembly. No findings were reported in this connection for the Reichstage at the turn of the century or - as is evident - for the Mexican Constituent Convention. It is noteworthy that in France the effect of noble status remains relatively stable even after controlling for the variables "occupation" and "region". Its influence on political positions does not appear to have been a function of economic interests or regional power constellations, but mainly the consequence of genuine "estate" orientations. On the other hand, in the Frankfurt National Assembly the weight of the variable noble status diminished considerably after controlling it for the remaining independent variables. Here its effect is superseded by regional influences: Central and Southern German nobles tended to occupy a position further to the left than their Eastern German counterparts.(24) Finally, in Great Britain noble descent had practically no significance for the determination of political positions in the left-right-dimension. This is a result that agrees with the findings of other investigations. They show that there is relatively little class distinction on the part of the British aristocracy towards the other segments of the upper-class.(25)

### 3.2.4 The Connection Between Regional Origin and Political Attitudes

The electoral region of the representative is the variable which has the greatest effect on their political positions in all of the parliaments we investigated. This findings are also ascertained by Peter Smiths study of the Mexican Constituent Convention. (26) The fact that region is a notoriously "difficult" variable precludes the attempt at an illuminating intuitive interpretation of these result. Region comprises territorial disparities of economic, social, and political structures, and one can hardly decide ad-hoc whether this catalog of variable dimensions is complete, or in what combination they became effective.

We have attempted to bring some light into this darkness by making an analysis of ecological data provided by the Statistique de la France. Up until now such an investigation has not been feasible for either the representatives of the British House of Commons or for the members of the Frankfurt National Assembly, since comparative ecological data is lacking at the level of the electoral district.(27)

A change of the units of analysis is connected with this step of the investigation: the attributes of the individual representatives are no longer of interest, interesting are the characteristics of the departments in which the representatives were elected. All in all 46 indicators were introduced which referred to the following properties of the departments:

- to the settlement structure (distribution of inhabitants among different classes of community size, concentration of inhabitants in 1846, proportion of the non-indigenous population);
- to the agricultural structure (proportion of the different classes of farm size, hectar price for first quality agricultural land, proportion of family members who were active or assisted in the agricultural economy);
- to regional mobility (change in the population concentration between 1841 and 1851);

- to the business structure (proportion of population as employees or workers in large and small businesses);
- to the structure of the tertiary sector (proportion of the population in the professions and in the civil service);
- to pupil and student quotas; and
- to the proportion of the population eligible to vote under the census system (1846).

By a factor analysis the original 46 indicators were "melted down" to ten factors which catch the structural characteristics of the departments. They are: urbanization (variance explained: 27,3 %), proportion of members of the civil service (9,4 %), settlement structure (7,9 %), "wealth" (6,8 %), dominance of large (5,2 %) and small farms (4,7 %), pupil quota (4,3 %), proportion of professions and clergy (3,6 %), proportion of doctors (3,4 %), and proportion of workers and employees in the industrial sector (3,1 %). In order to examine the connections between socio-economic context on the department level and political positions of the representatives, we have applied a stepwise regression analysis. The independent variables used were the factor-scores obtained from the ecological data, the proportion of rightist representatives was introduced as the dependent variable.

With an  $R^2$  of .14 the explanatory power of the ecological model was low. The factor "dominance of small farms", which has a BETA value of -.2 had the greatest weight. This actually means that the proportion of rightist representatives in those departments having a small proportion of small farms tended to be large. In view of the weak correlation this finding should be substantively interpreted only with caution and it is far from being a sufficient explanation for political regionalism in mid-nineteenth century France ( $R^2$ -change = 0.04). It seems reasonable to attribute this failure to the inability of our data to cover the politically relevant aspects of regional economic and social structure. There is also a theoretical substantiation of this reservation since economic and socio-structural disparities should not be equated *eo ipso* with interest conflicts. An interest differentiation requires always a "cultural definition of a situation" before it is transformed into a political conflict.(28) However, both objections do not hold true in the given case. If we replace the dependent variable "percentage of rightist representatives" with the number of votes obtained by Louis Napoléon in the presidential election of December 1848, the explanatory power of the ecological variables increases to a remarkable 57,1 %. This result - which in spite of the temporal closeness clearly deviates from the findings for the representatives of the *Assemblée Nationale Constituante* - cannot be given a further substantive interpretation here. It must be sufficient here to indicate that the ecological data do in fact comprise politically relevant aspects of the regional context, and that their small contribution to the explanation of the regional differentiation of the political camps in the *Assemblée Nationale Constituante* can not be attributed to their insufficient indicator quality.

The supposition that the more or less amorphous political attitudes of the representatives directly reflected the regional disparities of the social and economic structure is seemingly too simple to comprehend the actually more complicated mediating process. On the other hand, as the high BETA values in table 1 b show, both political camps are all too clearly concentrated in strongholds in certain départements. Thus, we can not assume that the representatives had acted independently of regional influences. The question is raised once again concerning the causes of the clear regionalisation of the political structure - a finding which differs so markedly from the rather unclear picture which the analyses of the

relationship between social class and political attitudes had provided.

A glance at the political topography of France during the investigatory period gives us a first hint: the distribution of the strongholds of both political camps follows in rough lines the borders of the provinces of the Ancien Régime. The leftist centers were in Southern France (Provence, Languedoc, Roussillon, Foix) in Burgundy, in the area of the Gironde estuary, in Flanders, in Alsace, and in Lorraine. The centres of the right were in Brittany and in the adjoining areas (Anjou, Maine, Vendée, Normandy), in the southern part of Central France, in the Paris basin, Picardy, Artois and in the Champagne area. The rest of Central France tended to be indifferent: i.e. it sent delegations in which neither the representatives of the right nor those of the left were clearly dominant.

With all necessary caution we suggest interpreting this pattern of geographical distribution of the political camps as an expression of a center-periphery conflict whose historical roots go back to the formative phase of the French state during the Ancien Régime. If one follows this interpretation, origin from the peripheries would explain an affinity for the left. These peripheries were integrated into the French monarchy at a late period, had maintained a certain administrative independence for a long time, and were centers of protestant resistance in the denominational conflicts of the 17th century (Deux Sèvres, Charente Inférieure). On the other hand, origin from the core areas of the old monarchy favored the adoption of a rightist position. We assume that regional leadership groups had an essential function in mediating these political traditions. It is known that they arranged the lists of candidates, and influenced the voting-behavior of the representatives in Paris.(29)

Since we do not have similar comprehensive regional data for Germany and Britain as for France, we can hardly decide whether these findings and interpretations can be extended. A first glance at the political topography of Britain and Germany, however, suggests the general applicability of the French pattern; it speaks for the superiority of such explanations which attribute the regionalization of political camps to cultural and administrative traditions as against to differing socio-economic contexts. Thus, in Germany the left was mainly recruited from the territorial rubble of the old Empire in South, West, and Middle Germany, i.e. from those regions annexed to the newly organized single states after the dissolution of the Holy Empire. A pronounced loyalty to the ruling dynasties had not developed in these regions. They were frequently seen as imposed regimes. In Great Britain, Scotland and Southern Ireland were the centers of the parliamentary left. These territories were integrated into the United Kingdom at a late period of time and they never had ceased to oppose the integrating centre.(30)

### 3.2.5 The Explanatory Power of the Basic Model

If we examine the total effect of the variables combined in the basic model, it becomes evident that the significance of social demographic variables, even after including regional origin, was relatively low. In the case of the Frankfurt National Assembly, age, noble status, electoral region, and occupation, all taken together, explain the variation in the left-right-index only up to 31 %. A comparison with the other parliaments shows an even lower effect: for the Paris National Assembly the variance explained was 22%, for the British House of Commons from the year 1841 to 1847 it was only 16 %. Using a similar model Peter Smith determined a value of 27 % for the Mexican Constituent Convention of 1917.

The frequent supposition that social background determines political attitudes is not supported by these findings. The social profiles of representatives from the right and the left do not differ considerably in the parliaments we studied. Thus, differences in such political positions can not be interpreted as conflicts between clearly differentiated social-demographic camps. This weak correlation exists independently of the economically, socially, and politically varying contexts.

### 3.3.1 The Interest-Theoretical Model

After the detailed discussion of the basic model, we will only briefly refer to the model variants and restrict ourselves to a comparison of the explanatory power of the different models.

We have distinguished two dimensions of the representatives' social position in order to test the interest-theoretical model. In the one hand, there is their "situs", i.e. their position in the system of the social division of labor as seen from a functional perspective. The indicator here is "occupation". On the other hand, there is their "status", i.e. their position in a system of social super- and subordination. Here the indicator is "social class". In the case of Great Britain we have introduced additional information about the quality of the education of the representatives and, as a covariate, information about their wealth. In the case of France and Germany there is additional information about intergenerational mobility.

TABLE 2a - 2c: THE INTEREST-THEORETICAL MODEL

Table 2a: The Members of the Frankfurt National Assembly 1848/49

Independent Variables	ETA	BETA
SOCIAL CLASS	.30	.25
OCCUPATION	.27	.26
VERTICAL MOBILITY	.10	.10

$$R^2 = .14$$

Table 2b: The Members of the French National Assembly 1848/49

Independent Variables	ETA	BETA
SOCIAL CLASS	.28	.30
OCCUPATION	.20	.16
VERTICAL MOBILITY	.06	.03

$$R^2 = .10$$

Table 2c: The Members of the British House of Commons 1841-1847

Independent Variables	ETA	BETA
SOCIAL CLASS	.22	.15
OCCUPATION	.23	.17
EDUCATIONAL STATUS	.19	.12

$$\text{Covariate: Wealth} \quad R^2 = .09$$

Despite the rather differentiated construction of the interest-theoretical model, its explanatory power remains small. In Germany the variance explained is about 14 %, in France and Great Britain it lies at about 9% and 10 % of the total variance of the dependent variable. The representatives' wealth and their social mobility had no significant influence on political attitudes.

The relative importance of the remaining variables varies contingent upon the national and historical context. While in the Paris National Assembly status effects dominate, in Germany situs and in Britain also the kind of education have a similar importance as status. We assume that these differences are attributable to the specific shape of socio-economic cleavages. In 1848 and 1849 in France the most important issues were the access to power and the right of participation for social classes that had been disenfranchised before.(31) In Great Britain the corn laws, the factory bill, and the electoral laws dominated parliamentary discussion; here distribution conflicts between economic sectors crossed with class conflicts.(32) In Germany both cleavages were present too. The attempts at constructing a unified internal market aggravated opposing interests within different economic sectors, whereas issues such as the abolition of aristocratic titles and feudal privileges referred to the stratification system of the society.(33)

### 3.3.2 The Socialization-Theoretical Model

We have tested the socialization-theoretical model in two variants, which include, first, the father's occupation and the educational status of the representatives second, their experience in the process of political socialization. As the result of an insufficient database we could not analyze all three parliaments under both aspects. We have tested the influence of value-mediating authorities, such as parents, school, and university for Great Britain and Germany. For France and Germany we studied the effect of experiences in the process of political socialization before the accession to the parliamentary mandate. Here the variable constellation comprised: "persecution resulting from political reasons", "acceptance and resignation of political functions in the civil service", and "succession to political offices". In France additional variables were included: "father's political function" and "length of membership in parliament before 1848".

Table 3a - 3b insert here

In France the explanatory power of this model variant is 13 %, in Germany only 3 %. This striking deviation is difficult to explain. In Germany the small weight attached to the variable "political persecution" is particularly irritating. We had expected a stronger connection to political attitudes, since it is plausible to expect that the experience of political persecution gave way to a fundamental opposition against the monarchical system. However this was not the case. For the relatively weak connection between political experiences prior to 1848 and political positions during 1848 as compared to France, we would suggest the explanation that in Germany the political system was incompletely differentiated.(34) Whereas in France political restrictions and preferences had a discriminating character which affected different status groups and political communities in different ways, in the pre-constitutional German states all those who did not participate directly in the framework of the institutions of the bureaucratic state were excluded from the decision-making process. Thus, a vehement criticism of the bureaucracy was by no means simply a concern of bourgeois leftists. It was also expressed by the members of the landed aristocracy who saw a



TABLE 3a - 3b: THE SOCIALIZATION-THEORETICALMODEL: POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

Table 3a: The Members of the Frankfurt National Assembly 1848/49

Independent Variables	ETA	BETA
POLITICAL PERSECUTION	.09	.07
CIVIL SERVICE MEMBERSHIP	.11	.11
POLITICAL OFFICES	.10	.08

$$R^2 = .03$$

Table 3b: The Members of the French National Assembly 1848/49

Independent Variables	ETA	BETA
POLITICAL PERSECUTION	.21	.21
CIVIL SERVICE MEMBERSHIP	.12	.10
POLITICAL OFFICES	.27	.26
FATHER'S POLITICAL FUNCTIONS	.13	.08

Covariate: Length of Parliamentary Membership before 1848

$$R^2 = .13$$

TABLE 4a - 4b: THE SOCIALIZATION-THEORETICAL-MODEL: SOCIALIZATION IN THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

Table 4a: The Members of the Frankfurt National Assembly 1848/49

Independent Variables	ETA	BETA
FATHER'S OCCUPATION	.17	.15
UNIVERSITIES ATTENDED	.05	.06
SUBJECTS STUDIED	.15	.14

$$R^2 = .03$$

Table 4 b: The Members of the British House of Commons 1842-1947

Independent Variables	ETA	BETA
FATHER'S OCCUPATION	.20	.16
PUBLIC SCHOOL ATTENDET	.17	.05
UNIVERSITY ATTENDED	.32	.28

$$R^2 = .13$$

danger to their traditional prerogatives.(35) In Germany the pre-March opposition was at first a heterogeneous collective movement which split into two political camps immediately before the March revolution.(36)

Table 4a - 4b insert here

The differences between Great Britain and Germany with reference to the significance of the socialization experiences during childhood and in the educational system are similarly striking. In Germany the socialization-theoretical model explains 5 %, in Great Britain 13 % in the variance of the dependent variable. We attribute this deviation to the different systems of elite socialization in both countries. The data show that in Great Britain the university, more than parents or school, was the value mediating authority with the greatest political impact. This result supports those hypotheses which assume a growing influence of later socialization experiences in the course of political socialization. (37) In Germany the significance of the university attended and the subjects studied is considerably less significant than in Britain. We attribute this to a more regionally dispersed and more accessible university system, which, in comparison with Britain, aimed at imparting knowledge rather than values.(38)

### 3.3.3 The Representation-Theoretical Model

The representation-theoretical model had the most explanatory power for all of the three parliaments we studied and for the Mexican National Convention as well. For Great Britain we tested this model by using an approach which includes information about the geographical situation of the constituency, its size (measured according to the number of voters), and its status (differentiated according to county and borough). Further, data were included which indicated whether the representative was a resident or non-resident of the constituency. In Germany in addition to the variables "situation of the constituency" and "relationship to constituency" we have included the length of residency of the representative and, as a covariate, the number of times the representative changed his residence.

TABLE 5a - 5b: THE REPRESENTATION-THEORETICAL MODEL

Table 5a: The Members of the Frankfurt Nationale Assembly 1848/1849

Independent Variables	ETA	BETA
SITUATION OF THE CONSTITUENCY	.46	.48
RELATIONSHIP TO THE CONSTITUENCY	.05	.10
LENGTH OF RESIDENCE	.05	.12
	<sup>2</sup>	
Covariate: Changes of Residence	R = .24	

Table 5b: The Members of the British House of Commons 1841-1847

Independent Variables	ETA	BETA
SITUATION OF THE CONSTITUENCY	.32	.39
RELATIONSHIP TO THE CONSTITUENCY	.13	.01
STATUS OF THE CONSTITUENCY	.30	.43
	<sup>2</sup>	
Covariate: Number of Voters	R = .23	

The explanatory power of the representation-theoretical model is 23 % for Britain. For Germany it explains 24 % of the variance of the dependent variable. These values come close to or are even higher than the values obtained for the basic model. This result confirms the central importance of the factor "region". Within the framework of the representative-theoretical model, all those variables which refer to the characteristics of the constituency had a significant influence on political attitudes whereas the kind and the length of relationship to the constituency is irrelevant. This finding indicates that the ties to the electoral region were effective despite geographical distance and a representative's short length of residence there. This is also true for France where the factor "region" was very important no matter how direct the relationship of the representative to his electoral departement was .(39)

In this paper we have already discussed in greater detail the kind of regional influences and the ways they were mediated. We have to admit that in this area our knowledge is still incomplete. In any case, however, it could be demonstrated that the influence of the factor "region" is larger than the usual preference on the part of many researchers for the interest-theoretical model would seem to justify. This result came unexpected since modernization theories maintain that in the course of national integration territorial conflicts between regions are superseded by functional conflicts between classes and economic sectors.(40) Our data show that territorial conflicts retain their central importance regardless of whether we are considering mature national states such as England or France or an unfinished national state such as Germany.

#### 4. SUMMARY

Regardless of the constant significance of regional influences the importance of other biographical variables varies considerably in different political and historical contexts. This finding strengthens the criticism of an approach which treats the connections between social-demographic variables and political behavior to some extent as anthropological constants.(41) In all, the influence which social-demographic variables had on political behavior was, in our investigation, clearly above the level of irrelevance. At the same time it was far away from determining the political positions of the representatives. The influences of the immediate parliamentary field of forces and the individual margins of action were clearly larger than theories of an external social guiding of parliamentary decision making could comprise. First findings of further research indicate, however, that in the German Kaiserreich the connection between social-demographic variables and political attitudes became stronger.(42) Particularly since the beginning of the 1880s a transition can be observed from an amorphous parliamentary system with socially heterogeneous political groups to a segregated parliamentary system with political camps clearly separated demographically from each other. This was a period in which specific social-demographic variables received a new political interpretation and significance. In this phenomenon we see an expression of the increasing importance of social-cultural cleavages as well as their growing influence on the formation of the political landscape.

Similar developments can be observed in Great Britain and France. In the decade after 1849 the era of class politics and the rise of working-class parties began. Instead of traditional loyalties and paternalistic dependencies economic interests became the single most important group defining force in all three polities subjected to our investigation. Provided that we experience the decline of class-politics today in Western-

European countries, a fact that is mostly discussed under the keyword "postmaterialism", our findings suggest that this may be the completion of a secular cycle which departed from a "prematerialist" shape of politics in the middle of the 19th century.(43)

# FOOTNOTES

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